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Edwin Baker is one of the foremost contemporary theorists of freedom of expres-
sion or speech. His Human Liberty and Freedom of Speech (1989) laid out what
Baker termed the “liberty theory” of freedom of expression. The theory was not
perhaps what the name seemed to imply, since Baker strongly opposed the “free-
for-all” or “marketplace of ideas” conception of freedom of expression. Rather,
he viewed the thesis that freedom of expression served liberty as implying gov-
ernment regulation should in part be regulation designed to ensure the freedom of
the press, since a free press has a fundamental role to play in the creation and
maintenance of a healthy democracy in which all citizens would flourish.
Baker’s subsequent work continued this focus on the freedom of the press
and the societal threats to it. In Advertising and a Democratic Press (1994), he
argued that “advertising seriously distorts and diminishes the mass media’s con-
tribution to a free and democratic society” (1994, p. ix: for an extensive discus-
sion of the book, see Shiner, 1995). Much of the argument of this earlier book
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rested on a sophisticated analysis of the actual economics of the mass media
industry. The book under review here, Media Concentration and Democracy,
continues both the concern with ensuring that the mass media make their due con-
tribution to a robust and healthy democracy and the reliance on sophisticated eco-
nomics. Briefly put, the thesis Baker defends in this book is that the recent
concentration of media ownership and thus of economic power in ever fewer cor-
porations is inimical to—and if not checked will eventually destroy—the proper
role of a free press in a democracy.
Baker argues that news corporations, or the communications industry in
general, play a special mediatory role in a democratic society. Democracies
require that their citizens be able to voice opinions and make informed decisions
about their government. Because the media influence the creation of public
opinion and how individuals cast their vote, the media therefore provide a cru-
cial forum for such communicative exchange. “The media, like elections, con-
stitute a crucial sluice between public opinion and formation state ‘will
formation,’” he writes. “For this reason, a country is democratic only to the
extent that the media, as well as elections, are structurally egalitarian and polit-
ically salient” (p. 7).
However, this special role has important implications. Information provided
by the media must be of superior quality: media product cannot be driven solely
by profit, nor can the media disproportionately present product of particular
biases. Democracy therefore requires that there be a fair dispersal of communica-
tive power—that is, opportunities must be equal to exchange opinions, ideas,
viewpoints, et cetera. Media concentration, in Baker’s view, is a major hindrance
both to the provision of quality media product and to the attainment of the dem-
ocratic standard concerning egalitarian dispersal of communicative power. In
media concentration, as media firms unite and profit becomes the main priority,
the quality of the product and the number of viewpoints represented are danger-
ously reduced. On the other hand, dispersed ownership, he argues, will lead to an
appropriately democratic distribution of communicative power, a structure that
provides safeguards against abuse of media power, and a pursuit of valuable jour-
nalistic product.
This argument is laid out in the first two chapters of the book, which consti-
tute a little under a half of it. In the remainder of the book, Baker considers and
rejects the idea that the market or the Internet can be trusted to solve the prob-
lem of media concentration by constituting an alternative source of communica-
tive power, and that the U.S. First Amendment on freedom of speech forecloses
on the kind of scenario he offers. In the final chapter, Baker considers practical
policy. He recommends increased legislation and taxation policies that discour-
age media mergers. He also urges that journalists and media company employ-
ees be involved in the merger decisions, since they are most knowledgeable
about media product quality. As well, he urges strengthened support for editorial
independence. 
To Canadians, of course, Baker’s concern about media concentration is not
either new or news. The Canadian Senate commissioned and released in 2006 a
far-reaching report expressing grave concerns about concentration of media own-
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ership in Canada. Many concerns are common to both the Senate report and
Baker’s book. However, there is one very important difference.
Both Baker and the Standing Committee on Transport and Communications
emphasize the detrimental effects that media concentration has on the quality of
media products and the dangers of media concentration with regards to the dem-
ocratic interests of the public. “It is impossible,” says the Senate, “to have democ-
racy without citizens and impossible to exercise meaningful citizenship without
access to news, information, analysis and opinion” (p. 65). In several places, the
Senate report stresses the importance of a diversity of sources for news and infor-
mation and the importance of a diversity of viewpoints. It stresses, too, how
media concentration is inimical to both of these goals. Only “a plurality of own-
ers” will guarantee “a variety of different sources of news and opinion”: thus
“there is a public interest in having a plurality of owners” (p. 64). 
Baker, however, focuses tightly on the fact that media concentration will
bring unequal democratic power to the large corporations that own many of the
media outlets. Baker’s view is rooted in a normative theory of democracy that
values democracy as an end, not merely as a means, because democracy embod-
ies the values of equality and autonomy. Increased concentration leads inevitably
to a public loss of democratic power. This loss of democratic power comes from
a lack of diversified media sources. The Senate report does not emphasize this
point specifically: the report talks about “power” only in relation to the legal
powers of the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission.
The Senate is really only concerned about a loss of viewpoints.
Baker, for his part, de-emphasizes the importance of viewpoints. Viewpoints
in news media, he believes, are simply commodities that consumers value in
much the same way as they value selection at a grocery store. True, fewer media
entities lead to fewer points of view: that just means the public is unhappy since
not everyone can see their own viewpoint as represented, just as the customer
misses her favourite type of good that the store no longer carries. Baker argues
that a concern for viewpoint diversity misses the point of why media concentra-
tion is so dangerous.
A single media entity could potentially provide an elaborately diverse system
of viewpoints, but these viewpoints would run the risk of sharing crucially simi-
lar elements, since they are indeed products of the same source. So, although
diverse viewpoints might satisfy the public, the hidden danger is that the “diver-
sity” they receive is not genuine. Only when diverse viewpoints also come from
diverse media sources and communicative power is maximally dispersed is the
public interest represented in the media in the truly democratic sense. The distinc-
tion between “sources” and “viewpoints” is therefore crucial for Baker. On the
other hand, although the Senate report talks about sources as well as viewpoints,
the report regards the two terms as interchangeable: no systematic distinction is
made between them.
For Baker, the distinction between “commodified” and “non-commodified”
values is also crucial. In a key passage (pp. 65-77), he discusses the proposal that
anti-trust regulation of the economic market is enough to break down media con-
centration in the way that democratic values require. He rejects the proposal on
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the grounds that anti-trust regulation only pays off with respect to the range of
commodities available to consumers. The three central values for the promotion
of democracy, however, are non-commodified values—an egalitarian distribution
of communicative power, content more beneficial to the community as a whole,
and a reduction of the risk of abuse of communicative power.
In our opinion, Baker’s analysis is greatly to be preferred over that of the
Senate report precisely because of this emphasis on power in his theoretical
framework. In a sense, this comment is unfair to the Senate, since it was not part
of their mandate to theorize at depth. The Senate Committee held hearings, sifted
evidence and opinions, and presented a report. The nature of the process presup-
poses a constraining weight to public opinion that is simply irrelevant to aca-
demic theorizing. Baker says little about a role for public opinion regarding the
permitting of certain mergers. This is presumably because he fears that the pub-
lic might be overly concerned with the commodity value of viewpoint selection
and possibly allow detrimental mergers simply because diversity of viewpoints is
not threatened.
However, it is necessary to look behind the fact of media concentration to the
social dynamics that produce it. Those are the dynamics of power—first, of eco-
nomic power, and second, more importantly, of communicative power. Social or
political theorizing that foregrounds the significance of power has of course
become common-place in the past few decades, taking off from the influential
writings of Foucault and others. Foucault does not get a mention in Baker’s book:
Baker is, after all, addressing an altogether different audience and discourse. But
his analysis resonates with the exposure by Foucault and others of the threat to
fundamental values posed by concentrations of power.
Methodologically, although it is true that Baker often focuses on policy and
policy recommendations, the argument of the book is not altogether empirical.
Baker’s arguments are abstract to the extent that they are arguments about the
design of social institutions and the inherent properties of such designs. So the
central claims are not empirical predictions that the consequences of concentra-
tions of economic power must in fact be anti-democratic. Compare here Marc
Edge’s (2007) recent study of the Asper media empire, where the argument is
empirically based. Baker’s idea is rather that certain forms of institutional
design—concentrations of communicative power, for example—are apt to have,
are inherently designed to have, certain consequences—interferences with the
flourishing of democracy, for example. The truth or falsity of the claim about apt-
ness does not directly rely on empirical evidence. It would be true, if it is (and we
think it is), even if no such interferences ever occurred, just as it would be true
that downhill skiing is apt to be dangerous (since it involves travelling over slip-
pery surfaces at high speeds at the limits of control over movement), even if no
one had ever been injured while downhill skiing.
Baker’s book is not easy reading: the analysis is sophisticated and complex,
and has many compelling details that we have not touched on here. For anyone
interested in the topics of the book’s title—media concentration, democracy, and
why ownership matters—as well as in the synergy between these topics, the book
is highly recommended.
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